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We propose a simple protocol for the verification of quantum computation after the computation
has been performed. Our construction can be seen as an improvement on previous results in that
it requires only a single prover, who is restricted to measuring qubits in the X or Z basis, while
requiring only one way communication, from the prover to the verifier. We also show similar constant
round protocols with purely classical verifiers are not possible, unless BQP is contained in the third
level of the polynomial hierarchy.
As quantum technologies begin to push against the
frontier of what is computationally feasible to simulate
using conventional computing technologies, the question
of whether it is possible to verify a quantum computation
performed on untrusted hardware has become increas-
ingly important [1]. This task can be naturally cast in
terms of a two party scenario: We take Alice to be a user
with limited quantum capabilities, who wishes to dele-
gate a quantum computation to be performed by Bob,
who has access to a universal quantum computer. How-
ever, Alice does not trust Bob to faithfully perform the
computation. In this case, if Alice is to make use of the
results obtained via Bob, she requires some method of
verifying that he has performed the computation as di-
rected.
In recent years, significant progress has been made in
addressing this problem of verification. In the ideal case,
Alice would be able to verify Bob’s compliance through
an entirely classical protocol, freeing her from the re-
quirement of possessing some quantum capability. Such
schemes, however, have thus far proven elusive. Current
approaches to this problem take one of two approaches,
either allowing Alice some limited quantum capability,
such as the ability to prepare [2, 3] or measure [4, 5] sin-
gle qubits, or the possession of a constant sized quantum
computer [6], or adding additional entangled provers to
the protocol [7–12].
Across both approaches, blind quantum computa-
tion [13] has proven itself to be an important building
block. Blind quantum computing is a secure quantum
computing protocol where a technologically limited Al-
ice can delegate her quantum computing to Bob without
leaking the information about her quantum computing.
While not all verification protocols have been constructed
from blind quantum computing protocols, almost all have
proven to be blind even if this was an unintended conse-
quence of the construction [6], with the notable exception
of Ref. [14]. Within the paradigm of blind computation,
two distinct approaches have emerged based on the differ-
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ent quantum capabilities assigned to Alice. In the first
case, Alice is taken to have the ability to create single
qubit states, which can be sent to Bob for processing [13].
In this setting, verification of the delegated computation
can be achieved by inserting isolated trap qubits into the
computation [2]. In the second approach, Alice is taken
to have the ability to perform single qubit measurements,
rather than state preparations [15]. In this setting, verifi-
cation can be achieved through the use of stabilizer mea-
surements on qubits transmitted from Bob to Alice [5].
The relatively low technological requirements for Alice’s
system have already led to experimental demonstrations
of both models of blind computation [16, 17], as well as
trap based verification [18].
Up until very recently, all known verification proto-
cols required interaction during the phase when the com-
putation is performed in order to verify its correctness,
effectively hiding the computation. Recently, however,
a new approach has emerged in which the verification
can be postponed until after the computation has been
performed [14], based on the use of efficient interac-
tive proofs with multiple entangled provers for the local
Hamiltonian problem [19, 20] to verify a witness state
which certifies the correctness of the computation. In
this paper we make use of a similar witness state ap-
proach to construct a single prover interactive proof for
BQP which is also post hoc, in the sense that it can be
performed after the computation to determine the input
has concluded. In the protocol we introduce, the verifier
needs only to make measurements of qubits in the X and
Z basis. Our result differs significantly from the previous
post hoc protocols introduced in [14] in that it requires
only a single prover, and requires communication in only
one direction. Unlike the approach taken in Ref. [14],
however, we show that it is not possible to “dequantize”
the role of the verifier: A single prover post hoc veri-
fication with a classical verifier and a constant number
of classical communications is impossible unless BQP is
contained in the third level of the polynomial hierarchy, a
widely accepted conjecture in computational complexity
theory.
We will restrict our focus to verifying the outcome of
decision problems. Let L be a language in BQP [31].
For an instance x, Alice wants to know whether x ∈ L or
2x /∈ L. Since L is in BQP, there exists, for any polynomial
r, a uniformly generated polynomial size quantum circuit
Vx acting on n = poly(|x|) qubits such that
• if x ∈ L then PVx(1) ≥ 1− 2
−r(|x|),
• if x /∈ L then PVx(1) ≤ 2
−r(|x|),
where PVx(1) is the probability of obtaining 1 when the
first qubit of Vx|0〉
⊗n is measured in the computational
basis.
In the setting we consider, where Alice is capable of
measuring individual qubits in the X or Z basis but has
no further quantum capability, acting alone Alice is lim-
ited to deciding questions in BPP. Thus, in order to de-
cide whether x is in L, she needs to make use of Bob’s
quantum capabilities [32]. Alice can simply ask Bob to
decide whether x ∈ L or x /∈ L, but is left with the task
of verifying whether Bob’s response is in fact correct.
Let us first consider the case when Bob tells Alice x ∈
L and wants to make Alice believe the fact. If Bob is
honest, x is really in L, but if Bob is dishonest and trying
to fool Alice, x is not in L.
Since L is in BQP, it is also in QMA with the triv-
ial witness state |0〉⊗w and the verifying circuit Wx ≡
I⊗w ⊗ Vx acting on |0〉
⊗w+n. Hence there exists a lo-
cal Hamiltonian H corresponding to the circuit Wx such
that
• if x ∈ L then the ground energy of H is ≤ a,
• if x /∈ L then the ground energy of H is ≥ b,
where b− a ≥ 1poly(|x|) [21]. It is known that H can be a
2-local Hamiltonian with only X and Z operators [22].
In order to justify his claim that x ∈ L, Bob also sends
a state ρ to Alice. If Bob is honest, it is a ground state of
the Hamiltonian H . If we follow a similar construction
as in Ref. [14] for the Hamiltonian, then this state will
encode the history of the circuit via a Feynman-Kitaev
clock [23, 24]. Since the witness state is the trivial state
|0〉⊗w, Bob can generate such a history state in a polyno-
mial time. If Bob is dishonest, ρ can be any state. Let us
write the 2-local Hamiltonian as H =
∑
S dSS, where dS
is a real number and S is a tensor product of Pauli op-
erators where only two operators are Z or X , and others
are I. We define the rescaled Hamiltonian
H ′′ =
1∑
S 2|dS |
H ′ =
∑
S
piSPS ,
where
piS =
|dS |∑
S |dS |
≥ 0,
H ′ = H +
∑
S
|dS |
=
∑
S
|dS |(I + sign(dS)S)
=
∑
S
2|dS |PS ,
and
PS =
I + sign(dS)S
2
.
In order to verify the witness, and hence the computa-
tion, Alice randomly chooses S with probability piS , and
measures S. By this we mean that Alice performs single
qubit measurements of only two qubits of ρ in the X or
Z basis and computes the product of the measurement
results, discarding the other qubits of ρ without measur-
ing them. Note that this does not require Alice to have
a large quantum memory, as she can receive the qubits
one at a time, resetting her system between reception of
qubits. If she obtains the result −sign(dS), she accepts.
It was shown in Ref. [25] that the acceptance probability
of such a procedure is
pacc = 1−
1∑
S 2|dS|
(
Tr(Hρ) +
∑
S
|dS |
)
,
which is
pacc ≥
1
2
−
a∑
S 2|dS |
when x ∈ L, and
pacc ≤
1
2
−
b∑
S 2|dS |
when x /∈ L. Their difference is 1/poly(|x|), and therefore
Alice can almost distinguish the case where x ∈ L from
the case where x /∈ L with probability of error bounded
to be exponentially small with only polynomially many
repetitions. Thus Alice can make use of measurements
on the witness state to ensure with arbitrarily high prob-
ability of correctness that it is in fact true that x ∈ L, as
claimed by Bob.
Let us next consider the case when Bob tells Alice x /∈
L and wants to prove that fact. If Bob is honest, x is
really not in L, but if Bob is dishonest and trying to fool
Alice, x is in L.
Let us define V ′x ≡ (I
⊗n−1 ⊗X)Vx. Then, because L
is in BQP,
• if x ∈ L then PV ′
x
(1) ≤ 2−r(|x|),
• if x /∈ L then PV ′
x
(1) ≥ 1− 2−r(|x|).
Therefore, there exists a local Hamiltonian H ′ corre-
sponding to W ′x ≡ I
⊗w ⊗ V ′x such that
• if x ∈ L then the ground energy of H ′ is ≥ b,
• if x /∈ L then the ground energy of H ′ is ≤ a.
This observation is a trivial consequence of the fact that
BQP is closed under complement. Running through the
same procedure as in the case where x ∈ L, it then follows
that the probability of Alice accepting the witness if x ∈
L can be made exponentially small.
3In the above protocol, Alice measures only two qubits
of the state that Bob has sent. In principle, however, this
does not need to be the case, as Alice is free to measure
each incoming qubit. While we do not pursue this ap-
proach in the current manuscript, we note that it may be
possible to significantly improve the performance of the
verification protocol to better estimate the energy of the
witness state. This could occur either by making use of
the fact that by taking the products of different subsets
of the results of local Pauli measurements can be used
to infer the results for up to 38 of all Pauli terms in the
Hamiltonian, or by making use of a modified Hamiltonian
in order to leverage gap amplification results [26].
One defining feature of post hoc verification is that
the number of rounds of communication required to ver-
ify the computation does not depend on the length of
the computation itself. We conclude by showing that
verification protocols with classical verifiers cannot have
this property, unless there is an unexpected collapse in
computational complexity.
We proceed by means of contradiction. Let us assume
that verification can be achieved with a single prover and
a classical verifier, with k rounds of communication be-
tween them, for some constant k, such that the probabil-
ity of Alice accepting an incorrect output of the compu-
tation is at most some constant c bounded below 12 . This
in particular means that for any language L ∈ BQP, if
x ∈ L, Bob can persuade Alice of this fact, whereas if
x /∈ L Alice cannot be persuaded. In other words, Bob
and Alice exchange k classical messages and
• if x ∈ L there exists a strategy for Bob such that
Alice accepts with probability ≥ 1− c,
• if x /∈ L for any strategy of Bob, Alice accepts with
probability ≤ c.
This is entirely equivalent to the statement that BQP ⊆
IP[k]. However, if we combine this with the known re-
sults [27, 28]
IP[k] ⊆ AM[k + 2] = AM[2] ⊆ Σp3,
we have to conclude that BQP is contained in the third
level of the polynomial hierarchy. Thus, by contradiction,
we must conclude that such verification protocols cannot
exist unless BQP ⊆ Σp3. Such an inclusion is considered
extremely unlikely given the established relationships be-
tween BQP and the entire polynomial hierarchy [29].
Note that although the above rules out constant round
verification of quantum computation with a purely clas-
sical verifier, it only holds in the case where there is
only a single prover. In the case where multiple provers
are allowed, a protocol for verification exists as shown
in Ref. [19]. Furthermore, this no go result cannot be
directly extended to the case of single prover proto-
cols with polynomially many rounds, since BQP is in
PSPACE = IP [30]. This does not, however, imply that
such protocols must exist, since the only known ways to
construct such a proof make use of a prover with power
to decide languages believed to be outside of BQP. Thus
the question of whether a purely classical verifier can ver-
ify a single quantum prover remains an important open
problem.
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